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ideas. One key influencer, Colonel 
Michael Wyly, came to occupy key posi-
tions in the Marine Corps educational 
establishment, where Boyd’s ideas crystal-
lized into maneuver warfare doctrine.
The Corps’s internal advocates eventually 
found senior leadership willing to push 
the service in a new direction, most 
importantly General Al Gray. In 1989, 
Commandant Gray issued Fleet Marine 
Force Manual 1. Entitled simply Warfight-
ing, FMFM-1 made maneuver warfare the 
key defining characteristic of the Corps’s 
operational approach; it has remained 
so for thirty years. It is significant to 
note, however, that the senior leaders 
who adopted maneuver warfare did 
not become converts as senior officers; 
rather, they had become interested in 
these ideas years before, ascended the 
ranks, then moved to implement their 
vision—an observation consistent with 
other studies of institutional reform.
The story of how a rogue Air Force 
fighter pilot shaped the core ideas of 
the Marine Corps is a case study in how 
militaries learn and change. Many similar 
case studies oversimplify this messy and 
imperfect process, creating a clean nar-
rative of progressive heroes and resistant 
villains. Brown avoids this trap—a success 
all the more impressive given the strong 
opinions that still surround Boyd. In so 
doing, Brown has produced a book that 
will take its place alongside Rosen’s Win-
ning the Next War and Bergerson’s The 
Army Gets an Air Force as a foundational 
study of military institutional change.
A New Conception of War skillfully brings 
an extraordinary, historic episode to a 
new generation of Marine Corps leaders 
and, in a larger context, to any leader 
who is contemplating leading change.
DALE C. RIELAGE
The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and 
Civil-Military Relations, by Christopher J. Lamb. 
Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018. 
330 pages. Available for download at jcs.mil/. 
Free.
Khmer Rouge forces boarded and took 
control of the U.S.-registered merchant 
vessel Mayaguez on 12 May 1975, 
then released the crew three days later. 
Coming just two weeks after the fall of 
Saigon, the move was considered a bra-
zen challenge to the U.S. commitment 
in the region. Ultimately the American 
response resulted in the release of 
the crew and their ship, at the cost of 
forty-one American servicemen killed 
and dozens wounded. Christopher J. 
Lamb, a distinguished research fellow at 
National Defense University, has written 
a thorough and evenhanded history of 
the crisis, demonstrating a command of 
existing literature and original sources.
In the immediate wake of the invasion 
and collapse of South Vietnam, the 
overwhelming motivation among 
decision makers was to demonstrate 
American resolve. President Ford and 
Henry Kissinger—the latter wearing 
both the national security advisor (NSA) 
and Secretary of State hats—were fully 
in charge, but Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger, Deputy NSA Brent 
Scowcroft, White House chief of staff 
Donald Rumsfeld, and other key actors 
all agreed with Ford and Kissinger that 
forceful action was necessary to reassure 
allies, to show Beijing that Washington 
would remain engaged in the region, 
and above all to deter Pyongyang. North 
Korean aggression was a real concern, 
as was a repeat of the 1968 Pueblo 
incident or the lesser-known EC-121 
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incident of 1969, in which North Korea 
shot down a USN surveillance plane, 
killing all thirty-one servicemen aboard. 
Kissinger in particular saw the U.S. 
response to that outrage as weak-kneed.
This desire to demonstrate resolve 
led to three waves of bombings of the 
mainland, a Marine assault on an island 
where it was thought the crew might 
have been taken, and a blockade in 
which Cambodian craft were plinked 
whenever possible. On these courses 
of action there was general agree-
ment early on; however, as the crisis 
rolled into its third and then fourth 
and final day, fissures emerged.
One issue was how long to continue 
bombing once Phnom Penh signaled 
an interest in dealing, and then fairly 
rapidly released the crew. After two 
successful bombing runs against the 
mainland, Schlesinger, his military 
assistant, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs, and the chairman’s military 
assistant wanted to divert planned third 
and fourth attacks to Tang Island, where 
a too-small number of Marines were in a 
desperate battle to regroup, gather fallen 
comrades, and evacuate. The military 
also argued that the bombing’s objectives 
had been attained without loss of life 
up to that point. Against Kissinger and 
Ford, Schlesinger lost the argument 
for diverting the third wave, but then 
won the argument on the fourth, which 
was in fact diverted. As Lamb points 
out, since the president and Secretary 
of State / NSA were still intent on 
demonstrating toughness, this probably 
cost Schlesinger his job. Ford would 
believe, with Kissinger’s encouragement, 
that Schlesinger had dragged his feet on 
bombing the mainland, which was not 
exactly the case; the Secretary of Defense 
was all in favor of bombing the mainland 
until he learned that the crew was on its 
way to safety. After that, he was more 
concerned about the undermanned 
Marine contingent fighting on Tang.
A more serious disagreement occurred 
on the issue of whether to continue 
plinking Cambodian ships once Maya-
guez’s crew was safe. Schlesinger agreed 
with his senior military advice that this 
would endanger U.S. military personnel 
unnecessarily and also risk hitting the 
ship carrying the Mayaguez crew. He 
therefore stonewalled the White House 
for several hours, then defended orders 
given by senior officers not to sink the 
ships. This probably sealed his fate as a 
soon-to-be-retired Secretary of Defense.
Lamb’s approach is to address the 
chronology first and then deal with 
theory, an approach that works well. 
As someone who has written on the 
subject in the past, he points out where 
interpretations should be adjusted on the 
basis of new evidence. He finds that his 
earlier work, which argued the existence 
of a belief system that created a focus 
on demonstrating U.S. resolve, gener-
ally holds up, but that there should be 
increased appreciation for several impor-
tant issues: insubordination regarding 
the sinking of Cambodian ships; the 
willingness of Ford and Kissinger to 
risk the lives of the crew by pursuing 
mainland bombing even after they knew 
the crew was being transported to safety; 
and Kissinger’s dominant role, including 
such actions as withholding a message 
from Tehran indicating Phnom Penh’s 
willingness to release the crew. Else-
where Lamb points out the willingness of 
senior military officers to accept Pacific 
Command’s optimistic interpretation 
of the degree of resistance on Koh Tang 
rather than the Defense Intelligence 
Agency’s more realistic estimate, as 
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well as the Marines’ failure to ask for 
an additional twenty-four hours and 
more troops to prepare for the assault.
This is an enjoyable history and analysis 
of an interesting interlude in America’s 
engagement with East Asia. One could 
argue that in the end Phnom Penh’s 
rapid move toward releasing the crew 
ran up against Washington’s perceived 
need to demonstrate resolve. Were 
that mind-set not so entrenched, it is 
possible that the attack on Koh Tang 
could have been either avoided or 
executed with appropriate force.
The ultimate measures of effective-
ness of the U.S. response are whether 
Pyongyang was deterred from action it 
would have taken otherwise and whether 
our allies were meaningfully reassured. 
On these matters the evidence is mixed.
JOHN GAROFANO
The Modernisation of the Republic of Korea Navy: 
Seapower, Strategy and Politics, by Ian Bowers. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 239 pages. 
$79.99.
For a state frequently described as a 
“geostrategic island,” South Korea’s 
maritime security remains a chronically 
understudied aspect of order in the Asia- 
Pacific. Ian Bowers’s The Modernisation 
of the Republic of Korea Navy goes 
some way toward filling this gap, with 
a persuasive account of the forces that 
have facilitated and shaped the last three 
decades of expansion of the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) Navy (ROKN) into 
an actor of regional significance.
Bowers argues that a combination of 
material and ideational changes were pur-
sued in the development of the modern 
ROKN. In physical terms, the addition 
of around twenty new classes of naval 
vessels in the last thirty years—combined 
with construction of a new base on Jeju 
Island and changes to hardware, training, 
and operational structure—has reflected 
the desire for a comparatively small but 
potent force that can be wielded ef-
fectively in pursuit of the South’s growing 
set of peninsular and regional maritime 
interests. Ideationally, Bowers sees 
post-1988 democratization in the South 
as a crucial underlying factor behind 
increased emphasis on the ROKN’s role. 
As the South Korean army’s political and 
cultural power waned during this period, 
the ROKN tapped into the peninsula’s 
maritime history to foster a burgeoning 
naval identity among South Korean for-
eign policy elites and the public at large.
Bowers also describes a changing 
international context for ROKN develop-
ment, highlighting the shifting role of the 
United States and China’s own emerging 
status as a dominant naval power in 
the region. A particularly persuasive 
chapter of the book is devoted to an 
assessment of the strategic and financial 
logic behind Washington’s shift from 
restricting ROKN development in favor 
of the South’s land forces to its new role 
as a facilitator of an expanding ROKN.
Notably, The Modernisation of the 
Republic of Korea Navy challenges key 
aspects of a common narrative of ROKN 
naval development that pits blue-water 
ambitions against an obligation to defend 
peninsular waters from the existential 
North Korea threat. For Bowers, these 
tasks are not as contradictory as they may 
appear, given the multifunctionality of 
naval platforms that can be used in both 
local and regional contexts. Bowers cites 
the example of the ROKN’s KDX-III de-
stroyers having been fitted with the Aegis 
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